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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
THE PROSECUTOR V. MILORAD
KRNOJELAC, CASE NO. IT-97- 25-I
After hearing the dispositions of both part i e s ,
the Appeals Chamber for the In t e r n a t i o n a l
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu g o s l a v i a
( I C TY) entered a judgment increasing the sen-
tence of Milorad Krnojelac from seven to fifteen
years. 
Milorad Krnojelac was the commander of
the Foca Kazneno-Popravni (KP Dom), one of
largest prisons in the former Yugoslavia. Du r i n g
the Serbian occupation of Foca city, where KP
Dom is located, the military police rounded up
h u n d reds of Muslims and other non-Serbs and
illegally detained them.  From 1992-1994, with
Krnojelac at the helm, the KP Dom prison was
home to acts of tort u re, beatings, countless
killings, forced labor, inhumane conditions, and
racial, political, and religious persecution.
Ad d i t i o n a l l y, Krnojelac assisted in the deport a-
tion and expulsion of the majority of Mu s l i m
and non-Serb males from the Foca municipality.  
Due to these acts and his role as commander
of the KP Dom, on June 6, 1997, Krnojelac was
indicted for crimes against humanity, grave
b reaches of the Ge n e va Conventions, and viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war.  On Ma rc h
15, 2002, the Trial Chamber found Krnojelac
guilty of crimes against humanity, specifically
persecution and inhumane acts, and guilty of a
violation of the laws and customs of war, part i c-
ularly cruel treatment. The Trial Chamber
acquitted Krnojelac of six counts, including the
crimes against humanity of tort u re, murd e r,
imprisonment, and inhumane acts, as well as of
c e rtain violations of the laws or customs of war.
Both Krnojelac and the Prosecutor appealed this
decision. 
Appeal of Krnojelac
Krnojelac presented six grounds for appeal
including an appeal of the sentence. The Ap p e a l s
Chamber dismissed as unlawful three of these
g rounds, which alleged errors of fact due to a
f a i l u re to meet the burden of pro o f. Krnojelac’s
second ground of appeal alleged that the Tr i a l
Chamber made an error of law when it found
him guilty of aiding and abetting through his
role in persecution via the imprisonment of non-
Serb civilian detainees and the living conditions
then imposed upon them. The Ap p e a l s
C h a m b e r, finding the Trial Chamber applied the
c o r rect criterion in evaluating the elements of
this crime, rejected this ground of appeal. After
re v i ewing Kro n j e l a c’s other grounds for appeal,
the Appeals Chamber found him guilty as a
superior for inhumane acts and cruel tre a t m e n t
for the beatings that took place at KP Dom. 
Appeal of the Prosecutor
The Prosecutor presented seven grounds for
appeal. First, the Prosecutor asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred as a matter of law in its def-
inition of the legal responsibility arising fro m
p a rticipation in a joint criminal enterprise.
Ac c o rding to the Pro s e c u t o r, had the definition
of joint criminal enterprise been applied corre c t-
l y, Krnojelac would have been found guilty as a
co-perpetrator and not as an aider or abettor for
the crimes of persecution (imprisonment and
inhumane acts) and cruel treatment (living con-
ditions). The Appeal Chamber agreed and
re versed the re l e vant parts of the Trial Chamber
judgment, finding Krnojelac guilty as a co-per-
petrator in persecution and cruel treatment. 
The Appeals Chamber rejected the
Pro s e c u t o r’s second ground for appeal, which
alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in its inter-
p retation of the law when it re q u i red that the
Indictment refer to an “extended form” of joint
criminal enterprise. 
On the third ground for appeal, the Ap p e a l s
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in
concluding that Krnojelac did not know or have
reason to know that his subordinates we re tor-
turing the detainees. Due to this erro r, the Tr i a l
Chamber refused to hold Krnojelac re s p o n s i b l e
under Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY,
which re q u i res personal knowledge of tort u re
for a conviction.  The Appeals Chamber
re versed, stating that the evidence clearly estab-
lished Krnojelac’s knowledge of the tort u re of
the detainees and there f o re he was liable under
A rticle 7(3).  In a related appeal, the Ap p e a l s
Chamber also found that Krnojelac had suffi-
cient information to put him on notice that his
s u b o rdinates we re invo l ved in the murder of
detainees at the KP Dom, re versing the Tr i a l
Chamber ve rdict. The Appeals Chamber noted
that for both charges the evidence prove d
Krnojelac was aware of the widespread beatings
and frequent interrogations taking place at KP
Dom. The Appeals Chamber stated that “he
had witnessed beatings, was aware of suspicious
disappearances, and had seen the bullet impacts
in the walls.” 
The Appeals Chamber also found that the
Trial Chamber erred when it determined that the
beatings constituting inhumane acts we re not
perpetrated on discriminatory grounds. This had
p recluded the Trial Chamber from holding
Krnojelac responsible for the crime of persecu-
tion. The Appeals Chamber noted that
Krnojelac knew about the unlawful detention of
n o n - Serbs at KP Dom when he accepted the ro l e
of commander. Fu rt h e r, the Appeals Chamber
held he was specifically aware of the mistre a t-
ment that occurred during his time as prison
w a rden. This behavior satisfied the central ele-
ments of the ICTY definition of persecution—
the deprivation of fundamental rights on dis-
c r i m i n a t o ry grounds.    
Again finding an error in the Trial Chamber’s
analysis of persecution, the Appeals Chamber
re versed the decision re g a rding the charge of
f o rced labor, finding Kronjelac guilty as a co-per-
petrator in a joint criminal enterprise of exploit-
ing non-Serb detainees through forced labor.
Fi n a l l y, the Appeals Chamber found that it was
u n reasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude
that there was no evidence that the transfer of
t h i rt y - f i ve detainees to Mo n t e n e g ro, as well as
other displacements, had been carried out on the
requisite discriminatory grounds. Finding that
t h e re was sufficient evidence to establish persecu-
tion, the Appeals Chamber found Krnojelac
responsible as a co-perpetrator.
Conclusion
As noted above, the Appeals Chamber ove r-
turned many of the Trial Chamber’s findings,
and its opinion often chastised the Tr i a l
Chamber for a misapplication of the law or an
i n c o r rect analysis of the facts. As it expanded
K r n o j e l a c’s liability, the Court signaled a willing-
ness to expand the boundaries of the crime of
persecution to include a greater range of acts. It
also clearly defined the minimum levels of par-
ticipation to constitute persecution. Because the
Appeals Chamber establishes precedent for both
the ICTY and ICTR, this decision may have far-
ranging implications for the charge of persecu-
tion at both tribunals. 
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA (ICTR)
PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT SEMANZA,
CASE NO. ICTR-97-20-T
On May 15, 2003, Trial Chamber III of the
ICTR delive red its judgment in the case of
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza. The (third )
amended indictment charged Semanza with
genocide, direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes
against humanity in the form of extermination,
persecution, rape, murd e r, tort u re, and serious
violations of Common Article 3 of the Ge n e va
C o n ventions and Protocol.  
Semanza was charged with both individual
and superior criminal re s p o n s i b i l i t y, pursuant to
A rticles 2(3) and 6(1), and for ordering under
A rticle 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. He was convict-
ed of complicity in genocide; aiding and abetting
extermination as a crime against humanity; rape,
t o rt u re, and murder as crimes against humanity;
as well as an individual act of murd e r. The Tr i a l
Chamber sentenced Semanza to twe n t y - f o u r
years and six months imprisonment. 
Analysis
Be t ween April 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994,
the period during which the violations of inter-
national humanitarian law re f e r red to in the
indictment occurred, there we re widespre a d
attacks against the ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda.
L a u rent Semanza served in the transitional par-
liament during this time. The court found that
he did not have de jure authority over militia-
men and that he did not exe rcise de facto author-
ity based upon his influence in the community.
In order to show a superior-subordinate re l a t i o n-
s h i p, evidence of a formal or informal hierarc h i-
cal relationship involving an accused’s effective
c o n t rol over the direct perpetrators must be
i n t roduced. A simple showing of an accused’s
influence in the community is not sufficient to
establish a superior-subordinate re l a t i o n s h i p.
Thus, the Trial Chamber held that Se m a n z a
could not be responsible for the crimes charged
in the Indictment under ord e r i n g .
Semanza was convicted of complicity in
genocide (Count 3) and of aiding and abetting
extermination as a crime against humanity
(Count 5). The Chamber found that in addition
to having knowledge of the genocidal intent of
the principal perpetrators at the various massacre
sites, Semanza possessed an independent intent
to destroy the Tutsi ethnic gro u p.  Se m a n z a’s spe-
cific intent to aid and abet in the commission of
genocide was inferred by the Chamber thro u g h
his actions and words. By his actions of bringing
soldiers, as well as In t e r a h a m we (“those who
w o rk together”), a faction of Rwandan rebels, to
m a s s a c re sites to assist in the killings, Se m a n z a
was deemed criminally responsible for complici-
ty in genocide and for aiding and abetting the
principal perpetrators who killed members of the
Tutsi ethnic gro u p.
The Chamber also found Semanza guilty of
rape, tort u re, and murder as crimes against
h u m a n i t y. The rape conviction is premised on
the defendant’s instigation of a crowd to rape
Tutsi women before killing them. The Tr i a l
Chamber determined that Se m a n z a’s instigation
in the rape of the Tutsi women due to their eth-
nicity was also sufficient as an act to constitute
the crime of tort u re. The analysis stated that
because he was encouraging a crowd to inflict
s e ve re physical or mental pain or suffering for
d i s c r i m i n a t o ry purposes, the one act met the ele-
ments of both crimes. Semanza was found not
guilty of persecution, as the Trial Chamber inter-
p reted the ICTR Statute to prohibit this crime
f rom being based on ethnic discrimination.
Semanza was convicted of a separate count of
m u rder as a crime against humanity based on his
instigation of a group of In t e r a h a m we re s u l t i n g
in six deaths.
Counts 7, 9, and 13 charged Semanza with
serious violations of Common Article 3 and the
Additional Protocol under Article 4 of the ICTR
Statute. In order to meet the burden of pro o f,
the Prosecutor proved beyond a re a s o n a b l e
doubt that: (1) a non-international armed con-
flict existed on the territory of the concerned
state; (2) that the victims we re not taking part in
the hostilities at the time of the alleged violation;
and (3) that a nexus existed between the
a c c u s e d’s alleged crimes and the non-interna-
tional armed conflict.
The Trial Chamber found Semanza not-
guilty of outrages upon personal dignity, in par-
ticular in the form of humiliating and degrading
t reatment, rape, forced prostitution, and any
form of indecent assault because the Pro s e c u t o r
failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the
alleged acts of rape and sexual violence. No con-
viction was entered for Count 13, violence to
life, health and physical well-being of persons,
specifically murd e r, as well as cruel tre a t m e n t
such as tort u re, mutilation or any form of corpo-
ral punishment. 
Sentence and Appeal
Semanza was sentenced to twenty-four ye a r s
and six months imprisonment, the initial 25
years being reduced by 5 months to compensate
for violations of his right to be pro m p t l y
informed of the charges against him during his
p re-trial detention. T h e re f o re, as of May 15,
2003, there remain seventeen years, four
months, and eleven days to be served.  On Ma y
29, 2003, Laurent Semanza filed a motion in
which he was seeking an extension to file his
Notice of Appeal of the judgment entere d
against him.  
Conclusion
The Trial Chamber decided not to expand
the bounds of the charge of persecution to
encompass Se m a n z a’s acts against an ethnic
g ro u p. Im p o rtantly though, the decision is a
s t rong statement against tort u re, the Chamber
did find that Se m a n z a’s acts of incitement to rape
we re sufficient to constitute both the crimes of
both rape and tort u re. Ge n e r a l l y, this conviction
re p resents a step tow a rds the ICTR’s goal of pre-
venting impunity. By convicting superior officers
and those seen as officials in their community,
the Tribunal goes beyond the primary actors and
expands the reach of justice. H R B
Sa rah Hy m owitz, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the ICTY for
the Human Rights Br i e f. Reza Lazslo also con-
tributed to this re p o rt .
Abby Richardson, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the ICTR for
the Human Rights Br i e f.
4 1
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol11/iss1/12
